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The "best interests of the child" is the standard for awarding
child custody in the United States, a standard that presumably
places paramount importance on the child's physical and psycholog-
ical well-being. While in theory this standard appears enlightened,
in practice custody decisions focus on parents rather than children
and are marred by personal and cultural bias. Predictions are made
without a scientific foundation and, frequently, in contravention of
research findings and constitutional equal protection requirements.
Because the "best interests of the child" standard is more a vague
platitude than a legal or scientific standard, it is subject to abuse
both by judges who administer it and parents who use it to further
their own interests.
This article begins with an explanation of the best interests stan-
dard and the problems caused by the vagueness of the standard.
The second section critiques attempts to simplify the decision-mak-
ing process through presumptions in favor of the mother, the pri-
mary caretaker, the psychological parent, and joint custody. The
third section discusses research findings, which suggest that mini-
mized familial conflict and continued contact with both parents
should be the most important goals in custody awards. The final
section of the article proposes a new method for achieving these
goals, by awarding custody to the party most willing and able to
minimize conflict for the benefit of the child.
L The Current Standard
Child custody law in the United States has evolved from the early
European concept of absolute paternal power,' to a presumption
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1. Under this concept of paternal power the child was treated as a chattel and the
father was granted complete rights, including the power to terminate the child's life. See,
e.g., Rex v. Greenhill, 11 Eng. Rep. 922 (1836).
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that the mother should be granted custody of young children,2 to
the current standard, which dictates that the custody award be made
in the best interests of the child.3
A. The Best Interests of the Child
Some states provide a list of factors to be considered in determin-
ing the best interests of the child,4 while others leave the determina-
tion of which facts are material to the discretion of the court. 5 In
either case, courts make custody decisions on an individual basis.
Statutes do not establish the weight to be accorded to any particular
factor. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the "best interests of
the child" means a "happy" childhood or a childhood that leads to a
well-adjusted adult regardless of the happiness experienced during
minority. 6 The answer to that question, like the weight to be given
to each factor, depends on judicial discretion.
Despite its shortcomings, the current best interests standard pro-
vides a welcome departure from the rigidity of previous rules. Rules
that automatically prefer one parent on the basis of sex are not sen-
sitive to the unique characteristics of each family or to the needs of
individual children. Furthermore, the best interests standard osten-
sibly focuses the inquiry on the child's needs rather than the par-
ents' rights. Given the relative fragility of the child and the fact that
the child did not participate in decisions concerning its conception
or the divorce, this focus on the child is admirable.
Theory and practice in custody decisions, however, do not coin-
cide. Frequently, the hearing and the law attend more to the com-
peting claims of the parents than to any consideration of the child's
interests. Proceedings revolve around the fitness of the respective
parents; 7 courts frequently do not request children's opinions; and
2. See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
3. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-332 (1986); Cal. Civ. Code § 4608 (West 1983
& Supp. 1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13 (West 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-21
(Burns 1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984); Md. Fain. Law Code
Ann. § 5-203 (1984 & Supp. 1986); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan 1984); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 452.375 (Vernon 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4 (West 1976); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-6-101 (1986); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.07 (Vernon 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.24 (West 1981).
4. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270 (Bobbs Merrill 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.24 (West 1981).
5. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4 (West 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101 (1986).
6. See Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 487-99 (1984) for a detailed discussion of the problem of defining
the best interests of the child.
7. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey ofJudges, 12




children routinely do not receive legal representation. 8 The defer-
ence paid to the parents is so obvious that one author has suggested
that the courts abandon the best interests charade and openly con-
sider the parents' interests along with the child's.9
B. The Problem
The landmark case of Painter v. Bannister1 0 demonstrates the
problems inherent in the current application of the best interests of
the child standard. That case involved a custody contest between
the father and the maternal grandparents (after the mother's death).
The trial judge awarded custody to the father; the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed and awarded custody to the grandparents. In its de-
cision, the court conceded that both parties were fit parents.II
However, the court characterized the father's lifestyle as "unstable,
unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimu-
lating,"' 12 while that of the grandparents was characterized as "sta-
ble, dependable, conventional, middleclass, middlewest .... 1 1
The Painter decision offered trial judges little instruction for de-
ciding future custody cases. The court did not identify factors that
determine what best serves the interests of the child, making the
decision appear arbitrary, based on the justices' personal preference
for one lifestyle over that chosen by the lower court judge. Perhaps
the decision indicated that stability constitutes the single most im-
portant factor in determining the best interests of the child. But
because the decision did not explicitly rely on stability or any other
factor, it sets no useful precedent. The decision is imprecise be-
cause the standard is vague. The Painter case illustrates that "the
best interests of the child" is not a standard, but a euphemism for
unbridled judicial discretion.
The vagueness of the best interests of the child standard does not
represent its only shortcoming: judges also express discomfort with
the decisions they have made utilizing the standard. One study,
conducted to determine whether judges could identify the "psycho-
logical parent" as ably as mental health professionals, found no sig-
8. S. Settle & C. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions: Content Analysis of a Judicial
Survey, Therapists, Lawyers & Divorcing Spouses 125, 133 (1982).
9. Chambers, supra note 6, at 499-503.
10. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
11. 140 N.W.2d at 154.
12. 140 N.W.2d at 156.
13. 140 N.W.2d at 154. Two years later, the child decided to live with his father, and
the grandparents acquiesced. W. Wadlington & M. Paulsen, Cases and Other Materials
on Domestic Relations, 663 n.1 (successor ed. 1984).
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nificant difference in their ability to do so but found that the
judiciary was less comfortable with its determinations. 4 Unlike
mental health professionals, however, judges grant custody on the
basis of their assessments. Judges cannot be certain that their deci-
sions are best for the children involved; science has not yet provided
a sound basis for such decisions.' 5 Nor can judges be certain that
their decisions are legally correct, because the law remains unde-
fined. Judicial action lacks a scientific or legal foundation and must
be based on guesswork.
This high level of discretion not only increases the possibility of
error, but also may encourage litigation.16 The outcome is hard to
predict in a child custody case, because the court applies a vague
standard to a unique fact pattern. When the outcome is uncertain,
each party is more likely to litigate, believing that he or she will pre-
vail. In fact, the relitigation rate in divorces that include children is
10 times greater than in those without children.' 7
Recent studies have attempted to determine if there is any pattern
in the application of the best interests standard by judges. In one
study, Kentucky circuit court judges and commissioners reported on
their weighting of 20 factors in child custody decisions.' 8 The study
indicated that the most important factors were the judge's assess-
ment of each parent's: (1) maturity and judgment; (2) mental stabil-
ity; (3) ability to provide access to schools; (4) moral character; (5)
ability to provide continuing involvement in the community; (6) fi-
nancial sufficiency; and (7) sense of responsibility for the child.
Only the last of these factors involves the parent's relationship with
the child, as opposed to characteristics of the parent as an individ-
ual.' 9 The study also revealed a limited emphasis on factors related
to the continuity and diversity of social relationships within the cus-
todial home.20
14. Charnas, Practice Trends in Divorce Related Child Custody, 4 J. Divorce 57
(1981).
15. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-
minacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 229.
16. Meyer & Schlissel, Child Custody Following Divorce: How Grasp the Nettle,
1982 N.Y. St. B.J. 496.
17. Scott & Derdeyn, RethinkingJoint Custody, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 455, 493 (1984).
Unfortunately, the available data do not make clear whether custody issues alone are
being disputed. Similarly, the data do not disclose whether noncustodial parents reliti-
gate because they believe they can regain lost custody rights or whether they relitigate
because they simply cannot accept the loss of their child.
18. Lowery, supra note 7.





The evidence from the Kentucky study supports the argument
that judicial inquiry generally focuses on the parents' rather than the
child's best interests. The focus on the parents is justified by the
need to assess parental character in making judicial predictions of
the child's future welfare. However, the advisability of such specula-
tion is questionable. 2 ' In the absence of scientific indications that
particular characteristics will translate into successful custody ar-
rangements, the decision must be based on the judge's personal val-
ues and bias. Many of the Kentucky judges readily admitted that
their decisions were based on "gut" reactions. 22
The authors of the Kentucky study also pointed out that some of
the criteria utilized by the judges demonstrated a failure to comply
with legislation and to accept the results of current psychological
research. Specifically, one-fourth of the judges gave priority to the
mother over the father when the parents were in conflict.2 3 The fa-
ther was never given preference over the mother solely on the basis
of his sex.24 Scientific research, however, has disproved the sex-
based "tender years" doctrine-the proposition that young children
are best placed with their mothers. 25
A more recent study ofjudicial decision-making, in contested cus-
tody cases in Colorado,2 6 concluded that older judges (averaging
63.7 years of age, with an average of 19.1 years on the bench) were
more likely to award custody to mothers than fathers in contested
cases and that the burden in those cases was on the fathers to prove
that the mothers were unfit.2 7 Younger judges (averaging 38.2
years of age, with an average of 3.2 years on the bench) also granted
custody to mothers more often than to fathers but rejected the
tender years doctrine or a general maternal preference. 28 Younger
21. Mnookin, supra note 15, at 229.
22. Settle & Lowery, supra note 8, at 136.
23. Id. at 127.
24. Id. at 134. This phenomenon occurred despite the fact that Kentucky had passed
legislation four years earlier requiring equal consideration for both parents regardless of
the age of the child. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
25. Settle & Lowery, supra note 8, at 134.
26. Pearson & Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 211.
Fam. L. 703 (1982-83).
27. Id. at 718-21.
28. Id. at 719. Despite the apparent sex bias found in these two studies, other re-
search shows that men are more likely to obtain custody than women in contested cases.
Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 229
(1982). Contested custody case estimates range from eight to thirteen percent of all
divorces involving children. In the remaining 87 to 92% of the cases, the mother is
overwhelmingly agreed between the parties to be the parent with physical custody.
Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for
Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. Rev. 473, 517-19
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judges reported greater reliance on interim custody arrangements
than older judges.2 9 Most of the judges in both groups, however,
stressed the need for discretion and individual analysis in child cus-
tody disputes. 30
The Colorado judges, like those in Kentucky, reported that they
were not fond of domestic relations cases. In the words of one, "I
am playing God.... You can do extreme damage. Usually before a
decision I do not sleep. My stomach hurts. I would rather send
someone to life in the penitentiary." 3 '
These studies lead to several conclusions. First, the results of this
research must be interpreted with caution. Self-reporting is a highly
suspect research method because of inaccuracies and biases that oc-
cur absent an objective control methodology.32 At the same time, it
is hard to believe that a judge who admits noncompliance with a
statute or higher court ruling is not being candid. Onejudge admit-
ted that he concealed his reliance on temporary custody awards, an
action prohibited by the state supreme court, by couching his deci-
sion in terms of psychological parenting. 33
Second, judges' backgrounds and values strongly influence cus-
tody decisions.3 4 The gut feeling admission cited above and the
protestations of the authors of the Painter decision indicate that sub-
conscious values affect the process judges use to decide contested
custody cases even if it is impossible to measure this influence
precisely.
In addition, the studies demonstrate that the current decision-
making process allows too much judicial discretion. Use of the inde-
terminate best interests standard permits individual judges to ig-
nore the results of scientific research and to substitute their
prejudices and values for those of legislatures-specifically to sub-
stitute sex-biased custody decisions for sex-neutral statutory stan-
dards. Although limited judicial discretion is necessary to ensure
that case-specific issues are addressed, the current best interests
standard provides too much latitude in which judges can obscure
(1979). Perhaps these data indicate a reverse sex bias in contested cases, although since
these studies are based on statistics rather than interviews with judges, it is difficult to
interpret their findings.
29. Pearson & Ring, supra note 26, at 720.
30. Id. at 723.
31. Id. at 722.
32. See Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92
Psychological Bull. 310, 311-12 (1982); Levitin, Children of Divorce: An Introduction,
35J. Soc. Issues 1, 7-21 (1979).
33. Pearson & Ring, supra note 26, at 720.




the rationales for their decisions and allows them to base custody
awards on their personal values.
Finally, broad judicial discretion may exacerbate the conflict be-
tween parents. With outcomes uncertain, some parents may be en-
couraged to litigate. Others may enter "bad" settlements because
they perceive sex bias on the part of the court that might lead a
judge to deprive them of custody altogether.3 5 For example, fathers
may be discouraged from seeking custody because they believe that
mothers always win, or mothers may be discouraged from seeking
custody when fathers contest because statistics show that fathers
now win contested cases more often than mothers.
II. Failed Solutions
Courts have attempted to confront the dilemma caused by the
current approach to the best interests standard through establish-
ment of a rebuttable presumption in favor of one parent. The pre-
sumption simplifies the task of the adjudicator by narrowing the
scope of inquiry, and by providing for mechanical application of a
simple legal rule. When the presumption is rebuttable, the judge
may engage in a more detailed inquiry, but the likelihood of such an
inquiry is decreased. A presumption may settle the disquiet felt by
many judges by allowing them to abdicate responsibility for the cus-
tody decision to a legal norm. The tender years doctrine and the
psychological parent theory epitomize efforts to establish these pre-
sumptions, attempts that ultimately fail because they ignore re-
search concerning the best interests of children from divorced
families.
A. Tender Years Doctrine
The tender years doctrine, which has now been formally abol-
ished in most states, creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of
granting custody to the mothers of young children. The doctrine
reflects the societal stereotype that healthy development occurs
most readily if young children are raised by their mothers. Unless a
mother is proven unfit, courts following the tender years doctrine
routinely award her custody.
Although the tender years doctrine may still claim widespread cul-
tural support, recent psychological and sociological research chal-
35. Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 32 Cur-
rent Legal Probs. 65, 78 (1979).
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lenges the notion that the mother is the best parent for a young
child.36 While mothers may be the primary caretakers of children in
most American families today,37 some fathers fulfill that role. The
rationale for the presumption is not sufficiently compelling in light
of the current emphasis on the importance of fatherhood, the preva-
lence of two-career families, and the evidentiary burden the pre-
sumption places on fathers. As a result, most states now prohibit a
presumption in favor of awarding custody to the mother. 38
Despite legislative and appellate court action eliminating express
reliance on the tender years doctrine, studies of custody decisions
indicate that some judges continue to grant the mother a prefer-
ence. 39 The broad discretion and lack of guidelines inherent in the
best interests of the child standard allow the tender years doctrine
to survive. As a result, some fathers do not request custody because
they believe that they would not obtain custody in a contested
case.
40
B. Primary Caretaker and Psychological Parent
The presumption that the primary caretaker should be granted
custody is a gender-neutral version of the tender years doctrine. In-
stead of presuming that the mother is the primary caretaker, the
court inquires into the child-rearing practices of the family in ques-
tion. In most cases the primary caretaker will be the mother. The
new standard provides flexibility, however, for the more recent phe-
nomenon of homemaker fathers and two-career homes.
A more sophisticated variation on the primary caretaker presump-
tion is the psychological parent doctrine, originally espoused by
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. 41 Goldstein defines the psychological
parent as the person who maintains the strongest bond with the
child as a result of daily attention to the child's physical and psycho-
logical needs. 42 Although the psychological parent is not necessar-
36. See Santrock & Warshak, Father Custody and Social Development in Boys and
Girls, 35J. Soc. Issues 112 (1979); Settle& Lowery, supra note 8, at 134. See also Watts v.
Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 181-82, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289-90 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
37. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 28, at 501-02 n.85.
38. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.137(3) (1983); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 5-
203(c)(2) (1986); Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d. 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973).
39. Lowery, supra note 7, at 495; Pearson & Ring, supra note 26, at 715; Settle &
Lowery, supra note 8, at 134.
40. See Mnookin, supra note 35, at 101. See also Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 28, at
505.
41. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond The Best Interests of the Child (1979)
[hereinafter Goldstein].




ily synonymous with the primary caretaker, the psychological parent
concept is essentially an extension of the primary caretaker concept.
The primary caretaker is generally the psychological parent, because
continuity of care is the primary basis for the psychological bonding
between parent and child.
Goldstein identifies four principles upon which custody decisions
should be based: (1) the importance of continuity of relationships
and physical environment; (2) the child's sense of time with regard
to continuity and separation (since young children experience a
greater sense of urgency than most adults); (3) the law's inability to
supervise interpersonal relationships; and (4) the limitations of
human knowledge in making long-range predictions. 4 3 Based on
these guidelines, Goldstein concludes that: the psychological par-
ent should be granted custody, except where it is destructive to the
child;44 children should not be shifted around pending a final cus-
tody decision; 45 and all custody decisions should be final. 4 6 In addi-
tion, according to Goldstein, the custodial parent should determine
all matters regarding visitation. 47
Goldstein's theories follow logically if one accepts the proposition
that continuity is the most important factor in child placement. Psy-
chological studies demonstrate, however, that parental reaction to
divorce may alter parenting abilities and change existing parent-
child relationships. 48 As a result, placement with the psychological
parent may not provide the desired continuity. In addition, studies
show that continuity is not the determinative factor in healthy adjust-
ment to divorce;49 decreased parental conflict more directly influ-
ences child development following divorce. 50  The Goldstein
proposal, unfortunately, does little to minimize such conflict.
43. Id. at 31-52.
44. Id. at 19-20, 53.
45. Id. at 38-39.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Id. at 38.
48. J. Wallerstein &J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup 108-20, 158-60, 224-25 (1980).
49. Emery, supra note 32, at 313. One group of authors suggests that it is beneficial
to move male children to new communities after divorce because behavior problems in
boys following divorce are not forgotten by adults long after the boys have readjusted
and discontinued their antisocial behavior. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Play and Social
Interaction in Children Following Divorce, 35J. Soc. Issues 26, 44 (1979).
50. Ellison, Issues Concerning Parental Harmony and Children's Psychosocial Ad-
justment, 53 Am.J. Orthopsychiatry 73 (1983); Emery, supra note 32, at 313; Hethering-
ton, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce in Mother-Child, Father-Child Relations ().
H. Stevens, Jr. & M. Matthews eds. 1978); Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 215,
223.
275
Yale Law & Policy Review
The Goldstein proposition that the custodial parent have com-
plete control over visitation is an invitation to cut off all contact be-
tween the noncustodial parent and the child. In those few custody
cases that are contested, 51 both parties are generally seeking sole
custody. Often these parties are motivated more by anger against
the other party than by feelings of love and concern for the child. 52
As a result, custody and visitation rights may repeatedly be litigated
after the court enters its original order. The Goldstein proposal
would allow the prevailing parent to limit or prevent visitation with
the noncustodial parent. According to research, however, children
develop better when they continue their relationships with both par-
ents.53 Thus, granting the custodial parent complete control over
visitation is not in the best interests of the child.
Goldstein apparently dismisses the possibility of more than one
psychological parent. If there is more than one psychological par-
ent, the logical conclusion from Goldstein's theory would be that
the child requires a continuous relationship with both parents. But
by granting absolute control to one parent, the other is likely to be
cut off from the child, and the child is likely to experience a strong
sense of loss.
Paradoxically, Goldstein recommends finality while emphasizing
the inability of the court to predict future events. This view is
merely a corollary of the principle of primacy of continuity: no
change of circumstances assumes more importance than the con-
tinuity of custody. Despite the need for finality in custody deci-
sions, however, the inability of the court accurately to predict the
future requires that the courts not terminate access to the legal sys-
tem. Although Goldstein correctly argues that recourse to the
courts should be limited after the initial custody award, total preclu-
sion would be dangerous. The importance of continuity in parent-
child relationships, and the danger of frivolous custody relitigation,
does not justify prohibition of all modification actions. 54
51. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 28, at 504.
52. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 17, at 493; Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 103.
53. See Hess & Camara, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors in
the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. Soc. Issues 79 (1979); Wallerstein &
Kelly, supra note 48, at 215.






Joint custody appears to provide a simple and egalitarian solution
to the contested custody dilemma. By awarding joint custody, the
judge need not decide who is the better parent or speculate about
the child's future. As research concerning divorced families recom-
mends, children would have the benefit of contact with both par-
ents. 55 Neither parent would face the stigma of losing a custody
dispute, and extensive inquiries into the backgrounds and habits of
the parents would not be necessary. In fact, contested cases might
cease if the parties were certain that they would be ordered to share
custody.
Unfortunately, joint custody is not a panacea. Perhaps even more
unfortunately, legislatures already have passed statutes creating
joint custody presumptions, without fully considering the conse-
quences of their actions.5 6 The reality ofjoint custody differs mark-
edly from its conceptual ideal.
Joint legal and joint physical custody have been artificially sepa-
rated in the law and have very different meanings. Legal custody
relates to the legal rights of a guardian to make major decisions con-
cerning the child and to obtain information about the child that or-
dinarily would be available only to a parent or guardian.57 Physical
custody refers to the actual daily care, control, and responsibility for
the child. 58
Joint legal custody may be granted to both parents, even though
the court grants sole physical custody to one parent. Joint physical
custody does not require that half of the child's time be spent living
with each parent. Custody may alternate daily, weekly, monthly, or
yearly; the types of arrangements are as varied as the number of
families who adopt them.59 In an uncontested case, where the par-
ties are amicable or the noncustodial parent is not particularly inter-
ested in daily care of the children, joint legal custody without joint
physical custody does not present much of a problem. In a con-
tested case, however, splitting legal and physical custody may in-
55. See supra note 53.
56. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4600.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 598.21 (West 1981 & Supp. 1987).
57. See Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 644-45, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup. Ct.
1978); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1987).
58. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 645, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
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crease confusion and hostility without providing any benefit to the
child.60
Preliminary results of one joint custody study6' indicate that par-
ents relitigatejoint custody decisions less frequently than sole cus-
tody decisions. This study suggests that either the joint custody
experience is more satisfactory to the parents or that they do not
feel compelled or able to relitigate the issue. However, the study
cannot be considered conclusive regarding court-ordered joint cus-
tody, since only 18 of the 138 joint custody families sampled had
joint custody pursuant to court order.62 Thirty-three percent of
those 18 families relitigated their custody arrangement, as com-
pared to a 32% relitigation rate for sole custody arrangements. 63
A number of other studies illustrate the difficulty of assuming that
joint custody is as appropriate in contested cases as in voluntary
agreements. 64 Although most researchers surveyed relatively small
groups of highly motivated families, 65 children frequently reported
problems with divided loyalties and movement between house-
holds.66 One researcher found that within one year of her initial
interviews, one-third of the research sample had abandoned joint
physical custody. 67 An earlier study indicated that voluntary joint
custody arrangements benefited all parties, but that the few families
with involuntary joint custody experienced substantial conflict and
instability. 68
Research indicates that children develop better when conflict
levels decrease after divorce. 69 The studies ofjoint custody demon-
strate that voluntary joint custody provides continued contact with
both parents, to a child's benefit. Involuntary joint custody, how-
60. Many states specifically provide for or allow joint legal custody without joint
physical custody. See, e.g., Frey v. Wagner, 433 So.2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 728 (1981); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1987).
61. F. Ilfield, H. Ilfield & J. Alexander, Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 136
(1984) [hereinafter Ilfield].
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id. at 139.
64. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 17, at 484-88.
65. Id. The Ilfield and Luepnitz studies included a few cases of court-ordered joint
custody and Luepnitz included several "reluctant" joint custody agreements. Ilfield,
supra note 61, at 137; D. Luepnitz, Child Custody 38 (1982).
66. Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Re-
port of a Study, 51 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 403, 410 (1981). The Luepnitz study also
reported problems, but only two children (eight percent) complained. Luepnitz, supra
note 65, at 46.
67. Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the
Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. Rev. 739, 748 (1983).
68. Luepnitz, supra note 65, at 149.




ever, can maintain or increase conflict between warring parents,
thus impairing the child's development. 70 As a result, most propo-
nents of joint custody do not recommend court-ordered joint cus-
tody in contested cases. 7'
III. The Role of Research
Legal presumptions are useful shortcuts, but they must be based
on reality. Research provides clues about the reality of child devel-
opment following divorce, research that judges do not apply to their
decisions. Admittedly, the social and psychological sciences have
not provided definitive models for parenting or for identifying and
predicting the most beneficial environment for child development.
Nevertheless, conclusions from available research can provide use-
ful guides for judges and legislators.
Wallerstein and Kelly found that the psychological adjustment of
children of divorce depends more on the development and charac-
teristics of children at the time of divorce than on those of their
parents. 72 The psychological stability of the parents affected adjust-
ment after divorce, but did not always result in better parenting.73
Despite these findings, the factors considered by judges when decid-
ing custody cases usually focus on the parents.74
In Wallerstein and Kelly's research sample, children whose par-
ents adjusted poorly to divorce, children of "stressed custodial par-
ents," experienced more developmental or psychological problems
than children whose parents did not have. serious adjustment
problems. 75 At first glance, this finding would seem to indicate the
appropriateness of focusing on the parents; however, the study also
revealed that parental care before and after the divorce was not the
same. 76 Most children experienced a decreased level of care in the
year immediately following the divorce. 77 Some parents who ne-
glected their children prior to divorce improved with the alleviation
of the problems of the marriage, while some who were good parents
prior to divorce did not adjust well, exhibiting poor parenting skills
70. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 17.
71. Id. See also Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
72. Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 213.
73. Id. at 215.
74. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13 (West 1984); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan
1984). See generally Lowery, supra note 7, at 496; Pearson & Ring, supra note 26.
75. Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 224.
76. Id. at 99-102.
77. Id.
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long after the initial one-year adjustment period. Still others were
consistent in their parenting patterns before and after divorce.78
Thus, parenting at the time of divorce may not be a dependable
indicator of parenting following the divorce. 79
Isolation of the factors that most significantly affect post-divorce
child development is the most important contribution of the Waller-
stein and Kelly research. The one consistent finding of Wallerstein
and Kelly and subsequent studies is that the level of parental conflict
is the most important factor in child development after divorce.
Children in families with decreased conflict levels fare better than
their counterparts who experience continued or increased family
hostilities.80
In a review of child development research, Emery argues that
interparental conflict is the principal cause of children's problems,
rather than separation from one parent."' Emery's theory draws
support from research findings that: (1) there are more behavioral
problems in families with only one parent because of divorce than in
families with only one parent because of death; (2) children of di-
vorced parents from homes without conflict fare better than chil-
dren from intact homes with conflict; (3) children's responses to
divorce and discord are similar; (4) children of divorce who no
longer live with conflict do better than children of divorce with con-
flict present after the divorce; and (5) the problems of children of
divorce are frequently present before the divorce.82 In addition,
studies show that the negative effects of separation from a parent
are only present for a limited time.8 3
Although not as critical as decreased conflict, close contact with
both parents has been identified as a positive factor in several stud-
ies. 84 Research also shows that without frequent contact, fathers
eventually tend to lose all connection with their children.8 5 These
78. Id.
79. One group of authors suggests that parents alter their behavior temporarily at
the time of divorce to obtain a favorable review for custody. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note
17, at 496.
80. See supra note 50. One might argue that problems with research methodology in
this area weaken conclusions based on these studies. However, as Emery notes, because
independent studies each with a different methodology problem have reached the same
conclusions, one may place great weight in their findings. Emery, supra note 32, at 311-
12. See also Levitin, supra note 32, at 7-21.
81. Emery, supra note 32, at 313.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 314.
84. See supra note 53. In the case of an abusive parent, however, children fare better
when they are separated from that parent. Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 215.




findings underscore the need for adequate visitation with the non-
custodial parent.
IV. A Proposal
The legal system cannot eliminate all of the problems caused by
antagonistic parents, but it can minimize the damage that conflict
inflicts on the child. The research discussed above suggests the
need to decrease parental conflict yet maintain contact between the
child and both parents. It follows logically that the parent who is
best able to separate parental discord from his or her relations with
the child should have custody. This parent should be able to place
the child's interests above his or her own in order to avoid conflict,
and to allow the other parent access to the child.
8 6
A. Improving the Odds
A custody battle is not in a child's best interests unless one of the
parents clearly is unfit.8 7 In the majority of cases when parents fight
about custody and neither clearly is unfit, at least one of them is not
putting the interests of the child above his or her own. Research
confirms this hypothesis. As Scott and Derdeyn state:
Some parents may seek custody to better maintain a sense of purpose
and of continuity in the parental identity .... Maneuvers to punish the
offending spouse are particularly prominent. By sustaining the anger,
the rejected spouse may avoid the sadness that would accompany ac-
ceptance of the extent and finality of the loss .... [Tlhese issues also
provide the major route by which the couple can continue to attempt
to control and frustrate each other.88
Wallerstein and Kelly's research also suggests that interest in the
child's welfare may be only one factor motivating a parent seeking
custody:
Fighting between parents for the child's loyalty and affection at the
time of divorce is often related to each parent's need for that child's
presence to maintain self-esteem and to ward off self-criticism and de-
pression. Litigation over custody thus may reflect the dependence of
86. It could be argued that custody should be granted to the more contentious party
in the hopes that he or she would then stop fighting. This would encourage pre-hearing
conflict, however, which would be detrimental to the child. In addition, there may be a
greater likelihood that a contentious parent who is granted custody will interfere with
visitation.
87. The term "unfit" as used in this article is distinguished from the use of the term
in a situation where one parent is not as effective as the other, but he or she remains an
adequate parent.
88. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 17, at 493.
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the adult on the child, and the adult's need to hold on to the child to
maintain his or her psychic balance.8 9
Although the research addresses reduced conflict levels in gen-
eral, a judge cannot review all pretrial conflict to determine which
parent is more contentious. Such an investigation would consume
an inordinate amount of time, involve innumerable factual ques-
tions concerning reported statements by the parties, and allow
judges once more to make subjective decisions in determining
which parent was contentious and which was "justified" in any par-
ticular dispute.
Instead, inquiry at the custody hearing should be limited to a de-
termination of the reasons that the custody dispute has not been
resolved through negotiation. The judge should ask what has been
offered and why each party has refused to agree to the other's offer.
If the parents know that decreased conflict is best for the child and if
neither parent is clearly unfit, they should be required to justify the
court battle in terms of the child's best interests. Of course, if one
parent is clearly unfit, the judge would be free to award custody to
the fit parent. If both parents are unfit, the court could remove the
child from both of them and place it in foster care, or terminate
parental rights and place the child up for adoption.9 0
By forcing the parents to justify their failure to settle out of court
on the basis of the best interests of their children, the judge may
discover the ability and willingness of a parent to decrease conflict
and to allow access by the noncustodial parent. If the reason the
parents cannot agree is that they are incapable of speaking civilly to
each other, then the court could offer mediation services. If the par-
ents cannot agree through the intervention of a neutral third party,
then the parent who is blocking agreement should justify his or her
refusal to agree in terms of the needs of the child. If he or she can-
not, then that parent has demonstrated his or her inability to place
the child's best interests over personal needs. Custody should then
be granted to the other parent.
As noted above, this approach is not appropriate in cases where
one or both parents are unfit. An abusive parent clearly does not
avoid conflict and, therefore, would not be granted custody under
the above criteria. The neglectful parent may want to do what is
right to help the child, but may not have the ability or training to do
89. Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 48, at 103.





so. As a result, the hearing might cover all areas of inquiry pres-
ently explored and result in the same problems as the present sys-
tem. Allegations of unfitness would be specified in the initial
petition. In the proposed system an unfit parent is not a less effec-
tive one, but an ineffective one. If a parent is petty or spiteful in his
or her allegations of unfitness, he or she is not placing the child's
interests above his or her own to avoid conflict. The accusing par-
ent, therefore, would be denied custody. The knowledge that frivo-
lous allegations of unfitness may lead to loss of custody should
discourage such allegations.9 '
One parent might insist on custody because of a belief that he or
she is the better parent or that the other parent, although not legally
unfit, is not a "good" parent. Many gradations of parenting skills
fall short of the legal definition of unfitness. Arguably, a parent
should not be granted custody over one much more able to care for
the child. If one parent is truly better, however, he or she is likely to
understand the need to reduce conflict for the sake of the children
and less likely to raise as an issue the inadequacies of the legally fit
but less capable parent.
Even if the parents lack such foresight, the proposed system
should cause few problems. The parent charged with insufficient
parenting skills presumably helped to raise the child prior to the
divorce. The presence of both parents might have mitigated the ef-
fects of bad parenting by one, and the same might result if the par-
ents worked out a joint custody arrangement. If the judge were
allowed to decide which parent is "more fit," the system would be
no different than the present one, with the same problems of broad
discretion and decisions based on personal rather than scientific or
legal standards. In addition, research demonstrates that decreased
conflict levels correlate with healthy child development following di-
vorce; similar findings do not exist regarding any particular style of
parenting. Thus, the court should not attempt to choose between
two competent parents on the basis of parenting techniques or per-
sonalities, but rather on the basis of willingness and ability to de-
crease conflict levels.
91. Unfortunately, at times serious allegations might appear frivolous because the
complaining parent has failed to gather sufficient proof. Although the proposed system
cannot alleviate this problem, the present system presents this issue as well. It is un-
likely that the proposed system would exacerbate the problem.
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B. Benefits of the System
The possible benefits of the proposed approach are numerous.
Hearings would be brief and to the point. The court would escape
the protracted testimony concerning personalities and parenting
techniques that is necessary under the current system.92 By decreas-
ing the period of parental conflict caused by the custody hearing,
both children and the courts would benefit. In addition, although
the task of predicting which parent will provide a better home for
the child would remain, the criteria for that prediction generally
would be more reliable. Judges would be constrained in their use of
subjective factors, and the operative criteria-ability and willingness
to place the child's best interests over the parent's to minimize con-
flict and allow contact with the noncustodial parent-would corre-
late with scientific findings.
Subsequent hearings to alter custody would be discouraged be-
cause the petitioning parent would have to justify the renewed con-
flict in terms of the child's best interests. The petitioning parent
would have to show why the conflict created by repeated recourse to
the courts was beneficial for the child. If the petition claimed any-
thing short of the other's unfitness or a substantial increase in detri-
mental conflict, the petition would be dismissed. Relitigation for
harassment purposes would be less likely because of the certainty of
dismissal.
The proposed system would limit the amount of conflict in the
family by shortening the custody hearing and reducing the likeli-
hood of future legal disputes. Although parents may continue to
fight after divorce, the legal system would not prolong or encourage
conflict. Speedy hearings and reduced relitigation also would meet
Goldstein's concern about the child's sense of urgency and need for
continuity, without sacrificing recourse to the courts in the event of
a substantial change in circumstances.
C. Potential Problems
Although the above proposal may provide benefits over current
procedures, it creates some problems as well. The proposed system
fails to eliminate all judicial discretion, since the judge still must de-
termine whether a parent has been unreasonable in blocking agree-
ment on custody issues. No decision-making process can eliminate
92. This testimony still may be necessary in the case of allegations that a parent is
unfit. Unfounded allegations of unfitness should be discouraged, however, because they




all judicial discretion, however, while protecting the best interests of
the child. Discretion under the proposed system would be limited
to a determination of whether refusal to accept a custody settlement
offer is reasonable. Although judges' opinions will differ, the "rea-
sonable person" standard and determinations of "good faith" are
common in our legal system. Judges are trained to determine issues
of reasonableness, but they are not trained to predict accurately the
effects of parenting situations on healthy child development.
Another possible objection to the proposed system is that pretrial
negotiations would be divulged to the court. Our legal system gen-
erally discourages such disclosure to facilitate and encourage pri-
vate settlement of disputes. 93 Presumably, parties are more likely to
reach agreement if they can speak freely, confident that statements
and offers will not be repeated in court if they fail to settle. Without
confidentiality, the parties might fear that settlement offers would
imply admission of liability or would affect the amount of a possible
court judgment.
Child custody negotiations, however, involve issues different than
most settlement negotiations. There is no question of liability, and
there is no monetary award that could be affected by prior offers.
Suggestions for custody or visitation arrangements might be made
during custody negotiations, but if the child is of ultimate impor-
tance to the parties and the proposed arrangements are reasonable,
disclosure of such suggestions would not be unfair. Presumably, the
parent would only make offers during negotiations that he or she
felt were acceptable. Knowing that the judge might be influenced
by statements made during negotiation, a parent might only offer
the arrangement that he or she deems ideal and refuse to make con-
cessions, rendering settlement more difficult. Under the proposed
system, however, parents would be required to show that they were
reasonable during negotiations and that they failed to agree because
although one was trying to protect his or her children, the other was
not.
Obstinate refusal to make concessions also could be interpreted
by the judge as an inability or unwillingness to decrease conflict,
especially when such concessions would be beneficial to the chil-
dren. Refusal to make a concession would have to be supported by
a reasonable argument that the concession would not be in the
child's best interests. Likewise, unreasonable demands would indi-
cate an inability or unwillingness to decrease conflict in the child's
93. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 408; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 3221 (McKinney 1983).
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best interests and could result in loss of custody. Thus, the pro-
posed system would facilitate settlement by encouraging the parties
to make reasonable offers and demands and to be flexible during
negotiations.
To the extent that this proposal inhibits negotiation for child cus-
tody based on divorce issues unrelated to the child's welfare, it
would improve the present system. Our legal system should not en-
courage the use of children as bargaining chips to obtain monetary
benefits. Under the current system, parents can threaten to contest
custody or visitation to obtain a beneficial property settlement or
decreased child or spousal support. The case may be settled out of
court, but not until one parent has forfeited valuable rights in order
to avoid a custody battle.94 The proposed system would eliminate
the possibility of such unfair bargaining producing "unfair"
settlements.
Modification of the rules of evidence in child custody cases is not
without precedent. General rules of evidence have been altered for
other legal issues involving children. For example, hearsay may be
admissible in child neglect and abuse hearings. 95 The importance
of protecting children from child abuse and the difficulty of proof in
abuse and neglect cases justifies admission of hearsay evidence.
Similarly, the importance of protecting children from marital dis-
cord justifies admission of settlement negotiations. Because of
other incentives in the proposed system, disclosure would not tend
to discourage negotiation. Relaxation of the general rule to admit
statements made during negotiations, therefore, should cause less
of a legal dilemma than the admission of hearsay evidence in abuse
and neglect hearings.
D. Encouraging Settlement
The proposed system could be characterized as an attempt to
compel parties to settle custody disputes by themselves, through
their attorneys, or by mediation through third parties or the court.
That is exactly what should happen, if the resulting agreements fur-
ther the best interests of the child. Under the current system, ap-
proximately 90% of all custody matters are settled by private
agreement without court intervention.9 6 Presumably this is because
94. It should be noted that the parent who loses in this case is the parent who most
likely would win a custody battle under the proposed system, i.e., the parent who is more
concerned about the child and about avoiding continued conflict.
95. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1046 (McKinney 1983).




the parents know more about themselves and their children than a
court can learn during a hearing. Parents also may settle because
they prefer their agreements to the ones that might be produced by
court orders. 97 No research is available to prove whether parents
who settle are better at determining what is best for their children
than judges. Given the large number of cases settled privately at
present, however, the proposed system would not create problems if
it produced an increase in the number of families who use these
agreements rather than deferring to the court.
In addition to an increase in negotiated agreements, the proposed
system might encourage an increase in mediated agreements. Re-
sults of the Denver Custody Mediation Project show that couples
who reach agreement through mediation relitigate at less than half
the rate of their adversarial counterparts.98 Parents who utilized
mediation expressed greater satisfaction with the process and final
settlements than parents who used the adversarial process without
mediation.9 Project results also showed that parents who mediated
agreed to more frequent visitation for the noncustodial parent than
parents who did not. 00 Perhaps the most important and unex-
pected result of this research was that parents who failed to reach
agreement through mediation nevertheless reported that the pro-
cess helped them "to understand and communicate" with their ex-
spouses.' 0 1
Although the Denver research did not test for long-term gains 10 2
or for the effects of mediation on the adjustment and mental health
of the children involved, the study provides some early indication of
the possible advantages of mediation over the adversarial system.
Since litigation increases parental conflict, reduced relitigation
benefits the children of divorce and frees up the court's docket in
the process. In addition, the increased understanding and commu-
nication between divorced parents that results from the mediation
97. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that parents who litigated felt that
the process and final orders in their cases were unfair more often than parents who
negotiated or mediated a custody agreement. Pearson, Thoennes & Vander Kooi, Medi-
ation of Contested Custody Disputes, Colo. Law. 337, 342 (Feb. 1982).
98. Id, at 354.
99. See id. at 342.
100. Id. It should be noted, however, that the differences were not great in terms of
overall visitation time. Noncustodial parents with successful mediation set visitation at
7.7 days per month, unsuccessful mediation clients had 5.5 days per month, and parents
who did not mediate were granted 4.9 days of visitation per month. Id.
101. Id.
102. The last set of results was obtained six to twelve months after final court orders
were issued. Id. at 338. It should be noted that even in this short period, some dissipa-
tion of the beneficial effects of mediation was found. Id. at 354.
287
Yale Law & Policy Review
process is likely to decrease conflict after the divorce, even when the
parents do not mediate an agreement. Finally, the increased visita-
tion of noncustodial parents as a result of mediation contributes to
healthy child development following divorce.
Mediation does not provide an answer for the problems of all di-
vorcing parents. As with joint custody, some states have legislated
compulsory mediation in custody disputes without recognizing that
not all couples can mediate successfully.10 3 In addition, because
mediation of custody disputes is relatively new in the United States,
a number of other problems, including the practice of law without a
license by non-attorney mediators, informed consent, attorney-
mediators who represent neither party, attorney-client privilege in
the mediation session, fee sharing, the role of independent counsel,
and other issues must be resolved. 0 4 Despite the problems with
mediation, however, increased mediation under the proposed sys-
tem would represent an improvement over the current system.
E. Summary
In summary, legislation should be enacted to clarify the best inter-
ests of the child standard in custody proceedings as follows:
1. After an initial finding that neither parent is clearly unfit, the
determinative factor for granting custody in the best interests of the
child is the ability of a parent to place the child's interests above his
or her own in order to decrease parental conflict and allow access to
the child by the noncustodial parent.
2. A parent who claims that the other parent is unfit must allege
in the petition for custody the specific actions or omissions of the
allegedly unfit parent that make him or her unfit. Frivolous allega-
tions of unfitness will be held against the claimant, and claims of
relative fitness will not be considered.
3. Parents should be informed that research indicates that re-
duced conflict and access to both parents have been found to be in
the best interests of the child. They also should be informed that if
the court finds that they are contesting custody for reasons other
than the child's best interests, they will not be granted custody.
103. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4607 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 598.41(2) (West Supp. 1987). Pearson identified five groups that were poor candi-
dates for successful mediation. Pearson, Thoennes & Vander Kooi, supra note 97, at
340.
104. Discussion of such problems is beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed
analysis of the issues, see Mediation Debated, Explored at ABA Section Meeting, 1982




4. Custody hearings where neither parent is clearly unfit should
focus on the reasons that the parents cannot agree. The purpose of
this inquiry is to determine whether one or both parents are putting
their own interests above the child's to instigate or prolong a con-
flict. The parent who cannot justify his or her refusal of a proposal
on the basis of the child's best interests should not be granted
custody.
5. Mediation services should be provided to parents who appear
to be concerned primarily with their children's welfare but lack the
ability to agree. If the judge feels that he or she can solve the im-
passe quickly during the hearing, he or she may do so without en-
gaging formal mediation services for the parties.
6. Child custody hearings should be expedited and held before
any other contested issues of divorce are considered. Custody
awards should be appealable prior to final decisions of divorce and
should be given calendar preference.
7. The only grounds for modification of final custody orders
should be that the custodial parent is unfit, or that the custodial par-
ent has consistently failed to comply with the terms of the custody
portion of the divorce decree in a manner that increases parental
conflict and/or unduly interferes with the noncustodial parent's visi-
tation rights. Visitation rights also may be modified if there is a sub-
stantial change in circumstances, such as a change of residence by
one parent that makes the prior visitation schedule impractical.
Conclusion
Nearly one in every two marriages in the United States ends in
divorce;10 5 60% of the divorces involve couples with minor chil-
dren. 10 6 Between eight and seventeen percent of those families will
be involved in custody disputes,' 0 7 and those who do not go to court
to resolve custody conflicts nonetheless will be heavily influenced in
their negotiations by the legal standard. The lack of definition of
the best interests of the child standard and the broad discretion it
allows produce uneven results for the children whose lives are di-
105. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986, at 79
(106th ed. 1986).
106. Glick, Children of Divorced Parents in Demographic Perspective, 35 J. of Soc.
Issues 170, 174-75 (1979). Glick estimates that this number represented 28% of all
children under the age of 18 in 1976 and that by 1990, the figure will be approximately
33%. Id.
107. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 28, at 518; Lowery, supra note 7, at 497.
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rected by this system, increase the likelihood and frequency of litiga-
tion, and leave judges uneasy about the wisdom of their decisions.
The index to the Krause casebook on Family Law includes a cryp-
tic reference to "vultures" under the child custody section.' 08 The
associated text contains an article from the New York Times regarding
the behavior of a pair of California condors who were fighting over
which one of them would take care of their egg. They fought for
hours until their struggle resulted in the accidental destruction of
the egg. 10 9
The implication is clear. The egg was destroyed because, in their
enmity, the vultures were more interested in themselves than in the
egg. They lost sight of the object of their fight. As the battle inten-
sified, their attention became so focused on each other that they de-
stroyed the egg.
Parents who fight over custody of their children often wage war
with little regard for their offspring. Although the children, unlike
the egg, may not be totally destroyed, damage is almost certain to
follow. If the inquiry in contested child custody cases is confined to
determination of which parent is best able to place the child's inter-
ests above his or her own in order to reduce conflict, then all of the
parties involved-the court, the parents, and the attorneys-will fo-
cus on the reason for their deliberations: the protection and nur-
turance of the child.
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